













Ferdinand von Siemens 
 
 
CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 3553 








An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 










Empirical research suggests that - rather than improving incentives - exerting control can 
reduce workers' performance by eroding motivation. The present paper shows that intention-
based reciprocity can cause such motivational  crowding-out if individuals differ  in their 
propensity for reciprocity and preferences are private information. Not being controlled might 
then be considered to be kind, because not everybody reciprocates not being controlled with 
high effort. This argument stands in contrast to existing theoretical wisdom on motivational 
crowding-out that is primarily based on signaling models. 
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There is a wide-spread belief in human resource management and the popular business press
that exerting control can damage worker performance by eroding intrinsic motivation.1 This
view is consistent with numerous empirical studies from both psychology and organizational
economics.2 In their seminal contribution Falk and Kosfeld (2006) investigate such crowding-
out of motivation in an experimental work relationship. Workers can exert costly eort to
increase the payo of their bosses. Before workers choose eort, bosses decide whether to
control their workers. Imposing control forces workers to exert higher minimum eort. If
workers maximize their own payo, they should exert the minimum feasible eort to save on
eort costs. Falk and Kosfeld nd that even though many workers indeed always choose the
minimum feasible eort, a substantial fraction of workers exert less eort if controlled than
if not controlled. Exerting control in fact reduces average eort contributions.3
This empirical nding creates an interesting theoretical challenge. Some individuals choose
high eort if not controlled, and only medium eort if controlled. But choosing high eort
remains feasible even when being controlled: observed behavior thus cannot be reconciled
with transitive preferences dened purely over payo outcomes. Then why does exerting
control reduce voluntary cooperation? One might think that workers consider the pure act
of not being controlled as kind, and reciprocate with high eort. But as Falk and Kosfeld
(2006, p.1616) point out, this seems to be inconsistent with existing models of intention-
based reciprocity. The reason is that if workers exert higher eort if not controlled rather
than if controlled, they receive higher payos if controlled rather than if not controlled. But
then not controlling workers has to be considered unkind, exactly because workers then exert
higher eort. In short: if everybody expects workers to reciprocate not being controlled with
1See for example Manzoni and Barsoux (1998) and Herzberg (2003) who stress the negative consequences
of exerting tight control over employees. Foss (2003) provides a careful case study on the detrimental eects
of such micro-management.
2See for example Plant and Ryan (1985), Enzle and Anderson (1993), Barkema (1995), Ariely, Kamenica,
and Prelec (2008), Dickinson and Villeval (2008), and Dominguez-Martinez, Sloof, and von Siemens (2010).
These studies suggest that monitoring reduces performance if and only if the latter is perceived as imposing
control. Ryan and Deci (2000) and Frey and Jegen (2001) provide some theoretical background and additional
references to the extensive empirical evidence.
3Although there is some debate in the literature concerning the magnitude of the eects, an increasing
number of studies provide experimental evidence for the existence of hidden costs of control. See in particular
Charness, Cobo Reyes, Jim enez, Lacomba, and Lagos (forthcoming) and Schnedler and Vadovic (forthcoming)
who study the hidden costs and benets of delegation and control.
1particularly high eort, then not exerting control is no longer a kind action, and thus cannot
trigger high eort as reciprocal reaction.
Although the above argument is correct, the contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that
intention-based reciprocity can explain motivational crowding-out if individuals dier in their
propensity for fairness concerns and preferences are private information. The model considers
a simplied version of the control game from Falk and Kosfeld. The key assumption is that
individuals dier in their propensity for reciprocity: some are purely selsh in the sense that
they only care for their own monetary payos, whereas others are reciprocal in the sense of
Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). Preferences are private information.
The analysis shows that if reciprocal workers are suciently reciprocal and the fraction of
selsh workers is suciently high, there exists a pure-strategy reciprocity equilibrium in
which (i) selsh workers choose the minimum feasible eort, whereas (ii) reciprocal workers
choose lower eort if controlled than if not controlled. In such an equilibrium exerting no
control is unkind to reciprocal workers by the above argument. But it is kind to selsh
workers, since the latter are forced to choose higher eort if controlled. Bosses do not know
workers' preferences, and workers know that bosses do not know workers' preferences. Dene
the kindness of bosses as the expected kindness towards workers. In case many workers are
selsh, bosses are then - on average - kind if they do not control. In consequence, reciprocal
workers reciprocate not being controlled with high eort.
2 Related Literature
The present analysis adds to the theoretical literature on crowding-out by providing a new
rationale for hidden costs of control. In contrast to the present model, all prominent existing
theoretical models are based on signaling motives. Most closely related are Sliwka (2007)
and Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) since they include behavioral elements in analyses and
explicitly refer to the empirical evidence from Falk and Kosfeld. In Sliwka (2007) exerting no
control indicates that there is a high fraction of steadfast fair-minded workers. This induces
conformist workers - who want to comply with the prevalent social norm among steadfast
workers - to exert high eort. Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) argue that not controlling
signals altruism. This makes it more rewarding for workers to signal their altruism. For this
signaling to be credible, altruistic workers thus have to choose higher eort if not controlled
than if controlled.
2These studies build on an extensive signaling literature on motivational crowding-out. The
following list of articles summarizes some of the most popular arguments. In Spier (1992)
bosses might leave contracts incomplete - wages do not condition on project outcomes - to
signal that the job environment is more likely to yield favorable outcomes. This facilitates
worker participation. B enabou and Tirole (2003) focus on eort choices. Monetary incen-
tives or control signals that workers eort is less productive. Although monetary incentives
increase motivation in the short run, in the long run the eect is detrimental. In Suvorov
and van de Ven (2009) bosses transmit information on performance by paying discretionary
bonuses. This conveys information on workers' ability, which in turn aects the latters' fu-
ture eort decisions. Herold (2010) argues that leaving contracts incomplete reveals that
bosses believe their workers to be trustworthy. Bosses' beliefs aect their own future eort
contributions, which in turn in
uences workers' eort choices.
In the present paper private information on individual preferences is crucial. But in contrast
to all prominent existing arguments, the resulting explanation for motivational crowding-out
is completely independent from any signaling incentives. The reason is that workers perceive
the act of not being controlled as kind, and reciprocate with high eort. They do not care
about the types of their bosses at all, and any revealed information on bosses' preferences
has absolutely no impact on behavior.
Apart from complementing the existing theoretical arguments, the present model can also be
distinguished empirically from signaling explanations of motivational crowing-out. Signaling
only works if bosses possess information that is relevant for workers. This assumption is not
always equally plausible. In stable environments experienced workers could have gathered a
lot of information on prevalent social norms and the fraction of fair-minded steadfast workers.
Experienced workers might also know themselves and the characteristics of their job. The
altruism of a boss could have been revealed by his previous behavior towards workers and
stakeholders. It is also not clear - especially in anonymous laboratory situations - whether
being controlled can reveal information on what the boss believes concerning that particular
worker. Getting additional information in these situations - via the control choice of the
boss - might then have no big impact on beliefs. Motivational crowding-out should then
be limited according to signaling models. The present explanation based on intention-based
reciprocity predicts an undiminished deterioration of motivation, since not being controlled
is experienced as kind or friendly as such.
3Finally, the present analysis complements economic theory on intention-based reciprocity by
elaborating on the impact of incomplete information. Geaneakoplos, Pearce, and Stacchetti
(1989, pp.67-68) already indicate that psychological game theory might encompass incomplete
information. Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2009) further study psychological game theory in
dynamic situations that include incomplete information. Concerning reciprocity, Rabin (1993,
p.1296) argues that "Extending the model to incomplete-information games is essential for
applied research, but doing so will lead to important issues." The present paper illustrates and
discusses some of these issues, and it proposes one model specication that is consequently
shown to be fruitfully applicable. Rabin furthermore argues that incomplete information
might strongly aect the consequences of reciprocity. The present results fully corroborate
this view, because intention-based reciprocity can explain motivational crowding-out if and
only if reciprocity preferences are private information. The ndings suggest that a further
investigation into intention-based reciprocity and incomplete information might constitute
an interesting topic for future research.
3 The Model
Consider one boss interacting with one worker. The strategic situation is as follows. First,
the boss decides whether to control or not control the worker, ab 2 Ab = fc;ncg. Controlling
causes no costs. The worker observes the decision of the boss and then decides on his eort
aw. Eort can be high, medium, or low. The set of possible eort choices Aw(ab) depends
on the control decision ab of the boss, where Aw(c) = fh;mg and Aw(nc) = fh;m;`g. By
controlling the worker, the boss can thus prevent the worker from exerting only low eort.
The worker's eort choice determines both his payo and the payo of the boss as determined
by the payo functions b : Aw ! IR and w : Aw ! IR. More eort strictly increases the
payo of the boss and strictly decreases the payo of the worker, thus b(h) > b(m) > b(`)
and w(`) > w(m) > w(h). The strategic situation - without accounting for incomplete
information - is summarized in Figure 1.
The crucial assumptions in this paper are that individuals can dier in their propensity
for fairness concerns while individual preferences are private information. An individual is
either selsh or reciprocal, so that the type space is  = fs;rg. The individual type  2 
is private information, but it is common knowledge that each individual is reciprocal with
prior probability  2]0;1[. Selsh individuals are exclusively interested in their own payo.
Reciprocal individuals have intention-based fairness concerns in the spirit of Rabin (1993) and
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Figure 1: Control Game
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). These worker's utility is therefore not fully determined
by the above payos, but also depends on strategies and beliefs concerning strategies. The
paper only considers pure strategies.4 A fully specied pure strategy for the boss is a function
b :  ! Ab that species type-dependent control choices. A fully specied strategy for the
worker is a function w :   Ab ! Aw(ab) that species type-dependent eort choice
conditional on the observed control choice of the boss.
Perceived Kindness of Control Eort Choices
The present paper applies the denitions of reciprocity by Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and
Kirchsteiger (2004) while incorporating incomplete information.5 The kindness of an action
4In psychological games it is not trivial to evaluate the kindness of an observed action resulting from a
mixed strategy, as it depends on whether mixed strategies are viewed as deliberate mixing by an individual.
Further, the intentions of any observed actions will be interpreted as if behavior is always fully deliberate.
This seems to be more appropriate in the context of pure strategies. Like the present paper, the existing
literature on intention-based reciprocity focuses on pure strategies. For further discussion see Rabin (1993,
p.1286), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004, p.275 and pp.279-280), and Segal and Sobel (2007, pp.209-210).
5Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004, pp.287-290) explain the subtle dierences between their and Rabin's
specication. The changes are primarily adopted to facilitate equilibrium existence in sequential games.
Since equilibrium existence is not the main focus of the analysis, the present model largely follows Rabin's
specication. Section 5 further discusses the assumptions and related literature on reciprocity; special focus
is put on the robustness of results to the exact specication of reciprocity.
5is thus assessed by putting the payo consequences of that action in relation to the set of
payo consequences that could have been achieved by choosing alternative actions.6
Consider workers whose bosses haven chosen control action ab. Let max
b (ab) and min
b (ab)
be the maximum and minimum payos that theses worker can then give their bosses. These
payos depend on the control choice ab. Since there is a nite number of possible actions, all













b (ab)   min
b (ab)
(1)
describes the kindness of workers with eort choice aw towards bosses with control choice ab
as perceived by workers when they make their eort choice. Since workers can always choose
between at least two dierent eort levels that yield dierent payos, the denominator of the
above fraction always diers from zero so that the above expression is well dened. Note that
the kindness of an eort choice depends on the set of feasible payo combinations and thus
on the control choice.
Consider the kindness of certain control choices made by bosses. It depends on what payo
bosses expect to give to workers with their control choice. Beliefs now matter since they
determine expected payo consequences. Furthermore, reciprocal and selsh workers might
respond dierently to control choices. Certain control choices can therefore be rather kind
to selsh workers, and at the same time rather unkind to reciprocal workers. The crucial
assumption is that the kindness of an action depends on the information that the individual
holds when taking that action. Bosses cannot know their workers' types, and this is common
knowledge among bosses and workers. The kindness of bosses' control choices is therefore
the expected kindness towards workers. More specically, bosses rst assess the kindness of
an action towards workers with a particular type, that is, towards workers with particular
eort responses. The expected kindness is the sum of the type-dependent kindnesses towards
selsh and reciprocal workers, weighted with the respective probabilities with which bosses
believe to be facing these types of workers, or with which workers believe bosses to believe
to be facing these types of workers.
6Following Rabin (1993) only those alternative payo combinations are taken into account that are Pareto-
ecient conditional on equilibrium play. If in equilibrium an action increases the payos of both worker and
boss, it must thus be considered kindness neutral. Strict monotonicity implies that all payo combinations
are Pareto-ecient when considering pure strategies; but see the discussion in Section 5.
6Let w be the belief of bosses concerning the strategy of workers. Let max
w (w;) be the
maximum payo bosses believe to be able to give to workers with type  if bosses hold belief
w concerning workers' strategy. Dene min
w (w;) and e
w(w;) as the respective minimum





w (w;)   min
w (w;)
(2)
is the kindness of bosses towards workers as perceived by bosses taking control action ab if
workers have type  while bosses hold belief w concerning workers' strategy. If the above
denominator is zero, bosses expect workers to always get the same payo no matter what
they do. There is no room for kindness, and kindness is normalized to zero. Given belief w
concerning workers' strategy, bosses compute their kindness kbw(ab;w;) to workers with
type  conditional on their control choice ab. The expected kindness of bosses imposing
control choice ab is then
E kbw(ab;w;) = kbw(ab;w;r) + (1   )kbw(ab;w;s) (3)
where expectations are formed with probability  2 [0;1] with which bosses believe workers
to be reciprocal.7
The kindness of bosses towards workers as perceived by workers follows the above denitions.
As in Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) all observed control choices are considered to be
fully deliberate and intentional; this important assumption and the resulting updating of the
kindness of bosses is further discussed below. This perceived kindness depends on the belief
of workers 













is the kindness of bosses towards workers with type  as perceived by workers if workers
believe bosses to hold belief 
w concerning their strategy. The maximum, minimum, and
equitable payos are dened analogously to the above. The above kindness is set to zero if
the denominator equals zero. Since workers know that bosses do not know workers' types,
the expected kindness of bosses taking action ab is
E kbw(ab;
w;) =  kbw(ab;
w;r) + (1   )kbw(ab;
w;s) (5)
7An alternative approach would be to consider type-dependent eort choices as mixed strategy, and to
compute the kindness towards workers as if all worker were using that particular mixed strategy. Results are
largely robust to this alternative specication; see the discussion in Section 5.
7where expectation are formed with probability  2 [0;1] with which workers believe bosses
to believe that workers are reciprocal.
Finally, workers know the control choices of their bosses when making their eort choices.
Bosses take this into account and assess the expected kindness of workers conditional on their
own control choice.8 This implies that if bosses choose to control their workers, the expected
kindness of their workers does not depend on workers' eort choices if bosses had chosen not















The kindness of workers' eort choices follows from (1) and does not depend on any beliefs.
It is thus not necessary for bosses to form beliefs about the probability with which workers
believe to be facing reciprocal or selsh bosses. Expectations are formed with probability
 2 [0;1] with which bosses believe workers to be reciprocal.
Selsh and Reciprocal Preferences
It is now possible to dene selsh and reciprocal preferences. Given action ab and the involved
beliefs  and w dene









as the expected utility of reciprocal bosses. Parameter  2 IR+ characterizes the relative
importance of reciprocity concerns as compared to monetary payos. Reciprocal bosses thus
care for their expected monetary payo. But they also care for fairness. However, they do not
know workers' responses to their control choices. They thus compute the expected kindness
of workers, and multiply it with their expected kindness towards workers, all conditional on
the considered control choice.
Equally, the expected utility of workers given eort choice aw, control choice ab by their
bosses, and beliefs 
w and  concerning the beliefs of bosses is
Uw(aw;ab;
w;) = w(aw) +  E kbw(ab;
w;)kwb(ab;aw): (8)
Reciprocal workers thus care for their own payo, but they also care for fairness. All reciprocal
individuals put equal relative weight  on their reciprocity concerns. Selsh bosses and
8In this respect the present paper diers from Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and Falk and Fischbacher
(2006). Results are not very sensitive to the exact specication of reciprocity; see the discussion in Section 5.
8workers only care for their own expected payos. The respective utility functions of selsh
bosses and workers are characterized by (7) and (8) with  set equal to zero. All individuals
are fully rational and maximize expected utility.
Reciprocity Equilibrium
The equilibrium notions of Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) are adapted
to the present context with incomplete information as follows. First, equilibrium strategies

b and 
w maximize expected utility given the others' equilibrium strategies, given bosses'
equilibrium rst-order beliefs  and 
w, and given workers' equilibrium second-order beliefs
 and 

w. Second, rst-order and second-order beliefs are consistent with prior beliefs and





further yields  =  as bosses beliefs must be consistent with the common prior at the be-
ginning of the strategic interaction. This yields  =  =  since in addition workers' beliefs
must coincide with the beliefs of bosses. Thirdly, the above holds at all decision nodes so that
equilibrium cannot be based on unreasonable behavior o the equilibrium path. Fourthly,
kindness is updated as the game progresses under the assumption that observed actions have
been chosen completely deliberately.
To avoid tedious and uninformative case distinctions, the following cuto rule is implemented:
in case of indierence workers choose the lowest eort, and bosses control their workers. This
actually makes it harder to achieve the goal of the study - to nd an equilibrium in which
some bosses do not control while reciprocal workers reciprocate not being controlled with
exerting high eort.
9Irrelevance of Signaling
Since selsh and reciprocal bosses might behave dierently in equilibrium, workers might
update beliefs after they observe their bosses' control choices. The following arguments show
that equilibrium behavior is completely independent from the probability with which workers
believe their bosses to be reciprocal or selsh. Reciprocal workers care about the kindness
of the observed control choice. The latter depends on their beliefs 
w and  concerning the
beliefs of bosses concerning workers' strategy and types. In equilibrium these beliefs must be
consistent with workers' actual strategy w and the prior probability  with which workers
are reciprocal. The beliefs 
w and  - and thus also the perceived kindness of a control choice -
thus do not not depend on the type of bosses. Consequently, any reciprocal eort reaction
by workers does not depend on the probability with which workers belief their bosses to be
selsh or reciprocal.
Equally, reciprocal bosses care about the expected kindness of workers. That kindness only
depends on workers' actions, which by the above argument do not depend on beliefs con-
cerning bosses' types. Selsh bosses only care for the expected eort choice of workers, and
selsh workers only care for their own monetary payo, which depends on their own eort
choice. In all cases, it is thus irrelevant with what probability workers believe their bosses to
be reciprocal or selsh. For that reason none of the ensuing results is caused by any signaling
concerns. Exactly this distinguishes the present analysis from existing theoretical studies on
motivational crowding-out.
4 Results
Since the kindness of workers towards bosses does not depend on any beliefs or types, (1)
implies the following in any equilibrium.
Lemma 1 (Kindness of Worker) In any reciprocity equilibrium
kwb(c;m) =  1
2; kwb(c;h) = +1
2; (9)
kwb(nc;`) =  1
2; kwb(nc;h) = +1
2; and (10)
kwb(c;m) =





characterize the kindness of workers towards bosses.
A selsh worker always maximizes his payo, and therefore chooses the minimum possible
eort. This directly implies the following.
10Lemma 2 (Behavior Selsh Worker) In any reciprocity requilibrium

w(s;nc) = ` and 
w(s;c) = m (12)
characterize the equilibrium behavior of selsh workers.
Since the behavior of selsh workers is identical in all equilibria, Lemma 2 yields directly
max
w (
w;s) = w(`), min
w (







implies that controlling a selsh worker is unkind, whereas not controlling a selsh worker is
kind. This yields the following.










characterize the kindness of bosses towards selsh workers.

















Further, let 1 be the unique solution in ]0;1[ that solves













The present paper's main result is made formally precise in the following proposition. All
formal proofs can be found in the appendix.
11Proposition 1 (High Eort Reciprocation) Consider a reciprocity equilibrium in which
reciprocal workers reciprocate not being controlled so that 
w(r;nc) = h and 
w(r;c) = m.
Selsh workers behave as characterized in Lemma 2. Then the following holds.
(i) Such an equilibrium exists if and only if  < 1=2 and  > maxf1;2g.
(ii) Selsh bosses choose control if and only if   1. Reciprocal bosses choose
control if and only if   2.
(iii) If 2 < 1=2 then 0 < 1 < 2 < 1=2. For  2]1;2[ selsh bosses then
choose not to control, whereas reciprocal bosses choose to control.
This result is based on the following intuition. If workers are selsh workers with suciently
high probability - the ex-ante probability  is larger than 1/2 - then controlling workers with
unknown type is on average unkind, whereas not controlling workers with unknown type is
on average kind. If reciprocal workers suciently care for reciprocity - the level parameter
 exceeds a certain threshold - then they reciprocate not being controlled by exerting high
eort. This equilibrium exhibits the most important qualitative features of motivational
crowding-out as observed in the empirical studies.9
In contrast to the prominent existing theoretical explanations for motivational crowding-out,
signaling plays no role whatsoever in the above characterized reciprocity equilibrium. In fact,
in this equilibrium both selsh and reciprocal bosses might make the same control choices.
Workers then do not learn anything about their bosses' preferences.
But heterogeneous control behavior can arise in the above reciprocity equilibrium although
everybody holds the same equilibrium beliefs concerning the fraction of reciprocal individuals
in the population and their respective equilibrium behavior. This contrasts Sliwka (2007)
and Ellingsen and Johannesson (2008) who must assume heterogeneous beliefs to rationalize
heterogeneous control choices in equilibrium. The argument runs as follows. In the above
reciprocity equilibrium bosses' control choices primarily depend on the fraction  of reciprocal
individuals in the population. They also depend on the payo increase b(h)   b(m) that
bosses receive if workers exert high rather than low eort. If this payo increase is high,
it pays not to control workers even if only few workers reciprocate with high eort. The
9The exact cuto values for  and  depend on the specication of reciprocity preferences. In particu-
lar, with an alternative specication there might exist similar equilibria even if the majority of workers are
reciprocal and exert high eort if not controlled. See the discussion in Section 5.
12control choice of reciprocal bosses is also in
uenced by their reciprocity concerns and the
expected kindness of workers. If bosses exert control, workers are unkind and shirk. Since
controlling is equally unkind, it generates reciprocal bosses some utility kick from spite. Not
controlling workers is kind, but typically not reciprocated. The unkind negative reaction to
a kind control choice hurts reciprocal bosses. In consequence, reciprocal bosses have stronger
incentives to control workers than selsh bosses. Selsh and reciprocal bosses might thus
make dierent control choices in equilibrium.
All Other Pure-Strategy Reciprocity Equilibria
It turns out that in the present context there exist only rather intuitive equilibria in pure
strategies that depend in an obvious way on the level of reciprocity concerns. This section
describes the intuition for these equilibria; the technical details are available upon request.
Proposition 1 describes the reciprocity equilibrium for high levels of reciprocity. For medium
levels of reciprocity there can exist an equilibrium in which reciprocal workers always ex-
ert medium eort. Not exerting controlling is then kind to selsh workers, and kindness
neutral to reciprocal workers. Reciprocity levels have to be strong enough so that uncon-
trolled reciprocal workers do not exert low eort, but they must not be too strong so that
uncontrolled reciprocal workers do not exert high eort. Selsh bosses always control since
not controlling workers never increases eort, not even for reciprocal workers. Reciprocal
bosses also always control. The reason is that exerting no control is a kind action that is not
well reciprocated. This reduces the utility of reciprocal bosses. Controlling is an unkind ac-
tion, that triggers an unkind eort reaction. Exerting control thus generates a positive utility
kick from spite. As monetary and reciprocity incentives are aligned, reciprocal bosses control.
For low levels of reciprocity reciprocal and selsh workers behave in the same way: they choose
the minimum feasible eort. Not controlling is kind to both reciprocal and selsh workers.
However, reciprocity concerns are so weak so that even being unambiguously kind cannot
trigger eort choices that exceed low eort. All bosses exert control: selsh bosses have
monetary incentives to control, and reciprocal bosses have additional reciprocity incentives
to control workers in order to be spiteful.
13There exist no other reciprocity equilibria in pure strategies. The reason is that reciprocal
workers must then exert high eort once controlled. This can only be optimal if controlling
workers is considered to be kind. The latter is never the case for selsh workers. It also cannot
be kind to reciprocal workers for the following reason. Reciprocal workers cannot exert more
than high eort if they are controlled. Thus, exerting control is at most kindness neutral to
reciprocal workers. But then reciprocal workers maximize their payos and do not exert more
than the minimum eort once controlled. This demonstrates that the theory possesses some
predictive power as certain kind of behavior is ruled out in equilibrium: reciprocal workers
never exert more than the minimum eort once controlled.
5 Discussion
This section discusses some aspects of the current model specication. It shows that the
main result - in equilibrium some workers might respond to control by lowering their eort -
is quite robust with respect to the exact specication of reciprocity preferences.
Viewing Heterogeneous Behavior as Mixed Strategy
One assumption of the present specication is that the kindness of bosses is assessed by (i)
deriving their kindness towards workers with a particular type, and (ii) forming the average
kindness over all types. This appears natural given that workers dier in their types while
dierent types might use dierent strategies. Alternatively, one could simply treat all work-
ers the same while assuming that workers employ some mixed strategy. The kindness of a
control choice then depends on the expected payos to workers of unknown type, ignoring
that dierent types of workers dier in their behavior and thus receive dierent payos. The
following arguments show that the resulting specication of reciprocity does not change re-
sults fundamentally. Suppose workers use a mixed strategy analogous to the type-dependent
behavior from Proposition 1. Bosses then expect to give workers w(h)+(1 )w(`) if they
choose no control, and w(m) if they choose control. The logic of intention-based reciprocity
implies that exerting no control should be considered kind if and only if  is smaller than
some cuto value. Note that there might then exist an equilibrium in which the majority of
workers reciprocates not being controlled with high eort.
Although results are similar under both specication of reciprocity, there is one substantial
dierence. The present specication only considers Pareto-ecient payo combinations to
compute the maximum and minimum payos that bosses believe to be able to give to workers.
14If not controlling is kind, workers receive a higher expected payo if they are not controlled
than if they are controlled. But bosses might also receive a higher expected payo if they do
not control than if they control. Exerting no control then Pareto-dominates exerting control,
and must be assessed as kindness neutral. There then exists no reciprocity equilibrium in
which reciprocal workers always exert high eort if they are not controlled.
Kindness of Workers Not Conditional On Control Choices
Another aspect of the current specication is that bosses assess workers' kindness conditional
on their own control choice. Workers' kindness as perceived by bosses then does not depend
on workers' behavior given hypothetical control choices. This complies with the idea that the
kindness of an action should depend on the information available to the individual choosing
the action. Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and Falk and Fischbacher (2006) propose a
dierent specication: bosses compute the kindness of workers at the moment of their control
choice by taking into account the induced equilibrium payos. This kindness is invariant and
does not change when contemplating hypothetical control choices. Further, when dierent
types of bosses make dierent control choices, workers' kindness is aected by their eort
responses to the control choices of other types of bosses.
Using this alternative specication yields very similar results. The reason is that the behavior
of workers does not change as here specications coincide. Concerning bosses, consider the
equilibrium in which reciprocal workers exert high eort if they are not controlled. Workers
are initially considered to be unkind: they are unkind if bosses choose control, and since
only a minority reciprocates, they are also on average unkind if bosses choose not to control.
Reciprocal bosses then have additional incentives to be unkind, and are more inclined to
control than selsh bosses. Qualitative equilibrium characteristics are unchanged.
Falk and Fischbacher (2006)
The present model also diers from Falk and Fischbacher (2006) because they assume that
reciprocity preferences are in
uenced by payo inequality. Workers then consider a control
choice as kind if and only if they consequently receive higher payos than their bosses. The
following argument demonstrates that using this denition of reciprocity does not change
results fundamentally. Suppose reciprocal workers reciprocate not being controlled with
high eort. Reciprocal workers consider not being controlled as kind if the resulting payo
dierence w(h)   b(h) is positive. But since they then exert only medium eort, being
controlled is even kinder to reciprocal workers. The reason is that the payo dierence
15w(m)   b(m) exceeds w(h)   b(h). Further, since w(h) is the minimum payo bosses
can grant workers in equilibrium, the kindness of choosing no control is further reduced to
capture intentions. Exerting no control is therefore less kind towards reciprocal workers than
exerting control. Selsh workers choose low eort if not controlled and medium eort if
controlled. Towards selsh workers exerting no control is then kinder than exerting control.
If the kindness of bosses as perceived by workers is the weighted sum of the kindness of bosses
towards selsh and reciprocal workers, then exerting no control can be considered as kind if
and only if the fraction of reciprocal workers  is below some cuto. The present equilibrium
arguments then apply. However, the cuto for  depends on payos and can thus dier from
1/2. There might then exist an equilibrium in which a majority of workers exerts high eort
when not being controlled.
Segal and Sobel (2007)
Segal and Sobel (2007, pp.206-209) take a rather dierent approach towards reciprocity. They
argue that the kindness of a control choice depends on the resulting maximum feasible payo
for workers. This denition immediately implies that exerting no control is kinder than
exerting control. The reason is that exerting no control provides workers with the option to
achieve a higher payo than the maximum they could get if controlled. But this denition of
kindness - kindness depends on what workers could do, but not an what they actually do -
implies that a control choice is considered to be kind even if the subsequent equilibrium result
is unfavorable for workers. Intention-based reciprocity does not suer from this drawback,
since the denition of kindness is based on resulting payos. The main contribution of
the present paper is to show that such intention-based reciprocity might play a role in the
crowding-out of motivation.
Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007)
Schnedler and Vadovic (forthcoming) sketch how motivational crowding-out might be caused
by guilt aversion in the spirit of Battigalli and Dufwenberg (2007). Bosses could expect -
because of social norms or the framing of the decision environment - that workers exert less
eort if controlled than if not controlled. Guilt averse workers match these expectations, so
that behavior and expectations are consistent in equilibrium. However, in this application
of psychological game theory it can be unclear what constitutes reasonable expectations. In
particular, there might also exist an equilibrium in which bosses rightly expect workers to
exert higher eort if controlled than if not controlled. Rabin (1993, p.1285) argues that
one advantage of intention-based reciprocity is that it derives all behavioral components -
16the psychological game - from the material payos of the underlying strategic interaction.
Section 4 shows that this approach imposes structure which rules out unreasonable equilibria.
The present analysis thus demonstrates that despite restrictions on reasonable equilibrium
behavior, intention-based reciprocity might well explain motivational crowding-out if there
is incomplete information on individual reciprocity preferences.
6 Conclusion
The present paper shows that intention-based reciprocity can explain the crowding-out of
motivation if individuals dier in their propensity for reciprocity concerns while preferences
are private information. The main argument is that if many individuals are selsh and only
care for their own payo, then not exerting control is kind exactly because is is typically
not reciprocated with high eort. This complements the existing theoretical literature on
extrinsic incentives and motivation by oering an explanation for motivation crowding-out
that is not based on signaling motives. The present paper thereby adds to a small but growing
economic literature that applies models of reciprocity. For example, Englmaier and Leider
(2008) study optimal contracts and organizational structure in the presence of moral hazard
if workers are reciprocal, von Siemens (2009) shows how reciprocity can improve investment
incentives in a hold-up situation, and _ Iri s and Santos-Pinto (2010) derive conditions under
which reciprocity among managers facilitates or complicates collusion in the product market.
The application of intention-based reciprocity to economic problems might thus oer a fruitful
avenue for future investigation.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The equilibrium behavior of reciprocal workers implies max
w (
w;f) = w(m) and min
w (
w;f) =






=2. Concerning the kindness of a boss towards
a reciprocal worker this yields kbw(nc;
w;f) =  1=2 and kbw(c;
w;f) = 1=2. The expected
kindness of the boss towards a workers with unknown type is then
Ekbw(c;
w;) =    1=2 and Ekbw(nc;
w;) = 1=2   : (18)
while
Ekwb(nc;
w()) =    1=2 and Ekwb(c;
w()) =  1=2: (19)
is the expected kindness of the worker towards the boss as perceived by the boss.
17Now consider the optimality of the equilibrium behavior of bosses and workers. Consider
rst workers. The behavior of selsh workers is optimal given Lemma 2. Given the cuto
rule the behavior of reciprocal workers is optimal if and only if
w(h) + (1=2   )(1=2) > w(`) + (1=2   )( 1=2) (20)
w(h) + (1=2   )=2 > w(m) + (1=2   )(2b(m)   b(h)   b(`))=(b(h)   b(`)) (21)
w(h) + (1=2   )(1=2)  w(h) + (   1=2)(1=2): (22)
Constraints (20) and (21) ensure that if not controlled, the worker prefers to exert high rather
than medium or low eort. (22) ensures that if controlled, the worker prefers to exert medium
rather than high eort. As w(h) < w(`) constraint (20) can hold only if  < 1=2. This
condition with w(m) > w(h) implies that (22) can be ignored. Rearranging (20) yields as
condition  > 1 and (21) yields  > 2 with the cutos 1 and 2 as dened above. Note
that since b(h)   b(`) > b(h)   b(m) it is not clear whether (20) or (21) is binding even
though w(`)   w(h) > w(m)   w(h).
Consider next the optimality of the equilibrium behavior of bosses. Given the cuto rule
selsh bosses control in equilibrium if and only if b(m)  b(h) + (1   )b(`) or





This yields as condition   2 with 2 as dened above which directly yields 2 2]0;1[.
Given the cuto rule reciprocal bosses control in equilibrium if and only if




+ (1   )(   1=2) = B(): (24)
Since B(0) =  =2 < b(m)   b(`) and B(1) = b(h)   b(`) > b(m)   b(`) continuity of
B on [0;1] and the intermediate value theorem imply that there exists 1 2]0;1[ such that
B(1) = b(m)   b(`). Further, function B is strictly concave on [0;1] since B00() =  2.
It is thus quasi-concave and the upper contour sets P(x) = f 2 [0;1] : B()  xg are









= [1;1]. Convexity implies B() < b(m)   b(`) for all  < 1. Strict
concavity of B further implies that B(t1 + (1   t)) > tB(1) + (1   t)B(1) > b(m)   b(`)
for all t 2]0;1[. Thus, there exists a unique 1 in ]0;1[ that solves (16) with equality so that
reciprocal bosses do not control in equilibrium if and only if  > 1.
Finally, suppose 1 < 1=2. Then A() > B() and therefore B(1) < A(1) = b(m) b(`).
Further, B(1=2) = A(1=2) > A(1) = b(m)   b(`). Then the above arguments imply that
18there exists a unique 2 2]1;1=2[ with the property B(2) = b(m)   b(`). For  2]1;2[
optimality of the behavior of selsh and reciprocal workers then follows from the above
conditions. Q.E.D.
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